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Article 6

Afterword::Recompiling
Christopher M. Kelty

Curiously, none of the articles in this issue of Criticism are about open
source. For an issue boldly labeled “Open Source Culture and Aesthetics,” this might appear to be a problem. The claim is unfair, of course, but
not inaccurate: everything depends on the scope of the variable. The local
variable—very local—is a fairly mundane practice of software production and distribution (also called free software), diverse in itself to be sure,
but really quite distinctive; and, in terms of the great swirl of cultural and
technical production, not nearly as widespread or important as, say, standardized machine tools or spreadsheet accounting.
The global variable, however, is something more like a zeitgeist, a discourse, a social form, an aesthetic, and a political cipher. It is an unordered array of ideas, practices, capitalisms, technologies, moments, and
movements, from the cravenly enthusiastic to the naively critical to the
dismissive. Knowledge economies, distributed collaboration, Web 2.0,
critical approaches to intellectual property law, crowdsourcing, fan culture, prosumption, peer production, new configurations of property and
labor, changing conceptions of creativity, novelty and aesthetic norms, doit-yourself (DIY) culture, and so on.
As the editors of this issue expertly explore in the introduction, over the
last decade this local variable has been progressively redefined as a global
one. Open source—the local, specific software development practice—has
been modulated and transformed into something anyone can “call” (as it
were) from within any function. Consider how open source was introduced on Wikipedia in 2001:
Open source computer software is nominally owned by
one individual or entity and then licensed out according to
an open source license; the license gives the user free use
of the software as well access to the source code, so that
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the software can then be further developed by whoever is
interested.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Open_source&
oldid=271554)
And then consider the entry from 2011:
The term open source describes practices in production
and development that promote access to the end product’s
source materials. Some consider open source a philosophy,
others consider it a pragmatic methodology. Before the
term open source became widely adopted, developers and
producers used a variety of phrases to describe the concept;
open source gained hold with the rise of the Internet, and
the attendant need for massive retooling of the computing source code. Opening the source code enabled a selfenhancing diversity of production models, communication
paths, and interactive communities. . . . Subsequently, the
new phrase “open-source software” was born to describe
the environment that the new copyright, licensing, domain,
and consumer issues created.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Open_
source&oldid=418767638)
Aside from demonstrating what happens to clarity of thought in the
hands of Wikipedia, this change, which occurred sometime around the
summer of 2005, represents a moment of historical forgetting, in which
something concrete (a bunch of programmer geeks and their Silicon Valley admirers rewriting the once-beloved tools of university computer science departments and distributing them freely on the Internet by using
a clever legal license) is replaced by something abstract (a philosophy or
a pragmatic methodology of production in which access to the sources is
promoted), and in the process the causal relation between the concrete
and the abstract is reversed.
On the one hand, this is simple misrecognition (Marx is rolling in
his grave, but probably not uninterested in how this change can be so
clearly captured in the detailed revisions of Wikipedia—a veritable cinema of ideological formation). There are concrete, empirically specifiable,
and material realities to open source and the rush to replace them with a
label like peer production can only obscure that there is something called
open source software production, that it consists of specific practices and
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technologies, and that it is, for the most part, an ongoing concern in the
heart of the information technology industry. And what’s more, it is increasingly a practice with none of the glamour or historical grandiosity
attributed to it early on but with real effects on how that industry operates
as part of contemporary capitalism.
Indeed, whatever open source was around 2001 (and ergo, whatever
the Internet was), it’s a dramatically different thing around 2011. In 2001,
self-important geeks like Eric Raymond and Richard Stallman (the only
people scholars ever seem to consult on the subject) controlled a discussion about the production of free software and the nature of the Internet, aided and abetted by semicapitalists and hybrid entrepreneurs like
Bob Young (Red Hat software) and Tim O’Reilly (O’Reilly Publishers).
In 2011, by some estimates, paid employees of blue-chip companies like
IBM, Intel, Apple, Hewlett Packard, and Google perform more than 75
percent of the production of open source software, and most projects are
in the process of formalizing their existence as corporations, nonprofits,
or foundations.1
Today, open source in the industry generally still means what it did in
the past: openly licensed software applications for installation on a personal
computer (PC) or server, often software of an infrastructural sort. Except
that nearly every term in this definition has also changed, in some cases
starkly. Perhaps the most dramatic shift has been the replacement of the
architecture of the PC and its software by devices and their apps (applications). All this can still be conducted as open source software production—
and very much is by the likes of Google and the hundreds of companies
they have bought—but it hardly has the same meaning as it did in 2001.
The discussion amongst geeks—such as it is, muted and subterranean, and
primarily for those who still insist on the label free software—has turned to
the problem of how free software has become impossible in the age of cloud
computing, software as a service, or, more generally, the explosion of apps
and their stores.2 As our style of computing shifts away from the standalone PC and its applications to one where all our applications and data are
hosted by corporations charging for the services (or giving it away gratis in
hopes of winning advertiser dollars), the ideals of free software—grounded
in individualism and self-help, mutual aid, and freedom to transform our
technologies—become harder to implement or even imagine.
Thus has debate turned from a focus on proprietary applications and
infrastructure to a general concern with the proliferation of closed platforms like Facebook and Google; a confused welter of concern about
privacy, net neutrality, and security; and a lingering concern about the
sustainability of the utopian alternatives that free software represents.
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Despite Google’s claim to use and value all open source technology, the
fact remains that there is but one Gmail, and they control it absolutely.
Gone from most debates is any discussion about the magical powers of
self-organizing distributed collaboration. Software engineering, anyone
involved eventually discovers, is still fiendishly hard to do well.
On the other hand, there is something like conceptual specification happening in this move from open source software to open source generally—
and especially in pieces like those included here. It concerns whether this
materially specific set of practices actually represents or stands in for a
more general historical transformation—something that crosses all domains of production and consumption, not just those narrowly associated
with software, networking, and information technology. In my own ethnographic work, I noted that this intuition (that open source is something
more than just ways of producing and distributing software) follows remarkably quickly on the heels of understanding the details of the practice.
What I just characterized as misrecognition is instead almost uniformly
experienced as a profound recognition—indeed, even a revelation.
No doubt, some such recognition birthed this special issue of Criticism devoted to “Open Source Culture and Aesthetics.” It’s too bad that
the actual practice of open source software production (especially free
software and its real and imagined utopias) is not the subject of more
intense, sustained cultural analysis, but it is certainly no tragedy. I may
be the only person in the world to feel this particular pang of loss. However, it is nonetheless curious that software and its material, technical,
and economic gallimaufry are not more central to the general analysis
of open source culture (open access, open commons, open science, open
societies, or openness generally) in these pieces and others like them.3
As I said, the accusation is unfair (in this issue, both Stephen Voyce and
Ben Roberts delve into the details of open source software circa 2001 as
part of their arguments), and certainly the great majority of work in the
humanities simply continues in blissful ignorance of software, open or
not. Nonetheless, the point is whether software matters or not to the way
culture turns out.
The desire to see open source software be relegated to the status of just
one expression of open source culture stems no doubt from the sense that
software is an instance of culture, not a cause of it. And as a result, the existence of open source (both local and global variables) instantiates a drive
to search for its antecedents, its ghostly predecessors whose recognition
now can help make sense of how open source must have come about, and
how open source software will have turned out to be just an instance of
this more general historical process.
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It is almost as though software as a problem disappears in the same way
software as a thing does: by being compiled into a set of binaries that run
in the background but are no longer legible as such.
Each of these pieces engages in, or observes, something like recompilation—in particular, a recompilation of the sort that renders the sources
themselves virtually inaccessible. Ken Thompson (the coinventor of
UNIX) described this process in his Turing Award speech, a very short,
very intense meditation on the impossibility of trusting source code. The
speech is concerned with hackers and security and trusting code, and has
its own set of interests and contexts, but the point of his observation was
that no matter how much scrutiny one undertakes, a program (in his example, one that produces its own source code as its output) can hide its
origins in the process of being compiled, run, and the output recompiled.4
It is this moment of recompiling the source code that is akin to historical
forgetting: the moment when one starts to see a general abstract cultural
form instead of a concrete historical one. It is this moment that all these
pieces observe, reflect on, or in some cases perform.
Roberts’s piece most directly addresses this problem: the movement
by which Yochai Benkler was able to recompile the practices of free software into something more general and ostensibly universal, called peer
production. Benkler’s work is curious: it has been incredibly influential in
general without ever being taken seriously in its specifics by its intended
audience of lawmakers (the Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA]
still stands, copyright still expands, and commons are as hard as ever to
defend legally).
What Benkler’s move from free software to peer production obscures
is that all his examples (with the possible exception of car pooling) are
either variations on free software or directly dependent on the tools, networks, licenses, and practices innovated therein. It is only by strategically
ignoring the material and practical assemblage of things that emerged
through free software and the Internet (which I continually insist are of a
piece), in favor of a focus on the economic implications of different legal
regimes (which is Benkler’s bailiwick, after all), that he can reduce free
software to one instance of a more general and new mode of production.
Compile base into superstructure, discard source code, run superstructure
to generate a new explanation of the base. Repeat as necessary.
But lawyers and economists are doing this all the time, with every phenomenon around us. We hardly need Marx or “immaterial labor” to diagnose this constant recompilation of what were once concrete material
arrangements of power into simple binaries of legal and economic orthodoxy. But we do need, I think, to better resist it. Roberts’s recognition

476	christopher m. Kelty
of individuation is a good step in this direction: free software projects are
indeed projects—not firms, not nonprofits, and not voluntary associations.
They have an individuated organizational component, but it is not reducible to any of the forms we know. And indeed a similar diagnosis might
be made of the more recent reliance on the language of platform to identify this individuation problem.5 Nonetheless, it is the case that many of
the existing free software projects are undergoing a transformation from
this novel individuation to something more familiar (e.g., Star Office
begat Open Office, which was bought by Sun Microsystems, which was
bought by Oracle. While the software is still open source in a recognizable
sense, this formalization of the project’s status as one engineering project
amongst others in Oracle’s portfolio cannot be without consequence).
Voyce’s piece participates in the misrecognition but only by way of
prelude. His sources for explaining the rise of an open source poetics
are capsule histories of open source software and the intellectual property struggles of the last quarter century (and its centuries-long prelude).6
At a surface level, all this introductory work is still quite necessary. Both
the pathologies of intellectual property and the success or failure of open
source remain a mysterium tremedum for the majority of scholars out
there: they have yet to have their revelation. For Voyce’s piece, recompilation is quick work—what really makes a difference is not open source
software but open source poetics, or what used to be called found poetry,
concrete poetry, appropriation, language poetry, and so on, but has since
been modulated, upgraded, reverse engineered, and reconcocted by folks
at UbuWeb or Poetic Research Bureau into a new brew. Open source
software is a warrant and agent of legitimation for open source poetics.
But I wonder how it would look if the story of open source software detailed what it looks like now (bureaucratized, nonprofit-ified, App-happy
iPoetry?), not what it looked like ten years ago? But Voyce’s intuition
about this strikes me as accurate: one should turn to the work of poets
first, and not the work of intellectual property lawyers (critical though
they be) or free software demagogues, to make sense of what’s happening
both to poetry and through poetry to software and culture. Lest I be confused with a demagogue or seen as nostalgic for the heady golden days of
free software, I actually think UbuWeb and its partisans represent a more
chthonic practice than either free software or its peer production mirages.
It’s never a simple question of causation or precedence, but of the emergence of new forms, and contemporary poetry is (as hard as making this
claim might seem) where open source gets some of its sources.7
There are two moments of recompilation in Leisha Jones’s piece in this
issue of Criticism: one is the relation between the historically proximate

afterword::recompiling	 477
problem of fan fiction, or fan culture after the Internet, and the more
distant Bildungsroman. The piece is enlightening because, like Voyce’s,
it observes a difference between the kinds of writing that preceded open
source and those that follow it, but in this case without any explicit reference to the actual practices and techniques of open source software.
If my own hazy ethnographic recall serves me, fan fiction evolved in
close companionship with some open source software communities, with
no small number of overlapping participants trading ideas, texts, problems, and issues back and forth—most obviously issues of copyright and
fair use, but also concerns about distribution, the generation, and sustainability of communities and the necessarily uneasy relationship with the
industry that can give or take its life (to use an admittedly clumsy Twilight
metaphor). Stretch this process out in time, as an exemplar of Bildung,
and one has the makings of a sociologically rich explanation of how hacking and fan-fiction (fanfic) writing together generate proper ways of becoming for this generation and the next: a problematic that Jones labels
with that incredibly ugly word prosumer replete with the contradictions
and deceptions therein.
But the appearance of the prosumer is the second moment of recompilation: the open source novel becomes less about a concrete set of new ways
of being (new forms of property, new interactions with people, new tools
for making videos or distributing texts or building one’s own fanfic fan
base) and more about a set of subjectivities and collectivities (girl hordes)
enmeshed in the processes of capital and desire (sensate, brand, jouissance, friend, stereotype, polyglot). The prosumer is more a suspect in
Jones’s mystery than a protagonist, and this is good. But it fills the same
role in the work of those who celebrate it (e.g., Ritzer and Jurgenson)8
as peer production in Benkler’s work: a way of collapsing the material
specificities of capitalist production into a figure that has always already
been lurking in capitalism, a figure repressed by the binaries of production and consumption. Such a logic is entirely too complex to be useful to
anyone, unfortunately—but, as Jones intuits, not irrelevant to contemporary Bildung.
Alexander Galloway’s piece in this issue of Criticism, finally, is blunt
about open source: “The open-source culture of new media really means
one thing today: it means open interfaces” (para. 22). This might be an
effect of recompilation rather than an instance of it: it’s not hard to distinguish between this open source and that open source, provided one takes
the time to do so. But recompilation discards the source (open source software), as it were, and introduces the new runtime instance of open source
(culture) to which it becomes possible to object, probably for the right
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intuitive reasons, as something that is blinding us to our own interests.
Thus does Galloway counsel: “The interesting question is not so much
whether open source is ‘more open’ or ‘less open’ than other systems of
knowledge, but rather the question ‘How does open source shape systems
of storage and transmission of knowledge?’” (para. 22). And, we are beguiled by the “short-term candy of openness as such” (para. 24) and risk
mistaking a very local variable for the global one: the renewed spirit of
capitalism. I think I agree.
Galloway’s quarry is elsewhere, however, though not unrelated: the
state of academic media studies. Galloway’s critique of Lev Manovich’s
work is also concerned with a moment of recompilation: Manovich’s
focus on cinema as the original new media. For Manovich, new media in
its contemporary specificity is compiled into a cinematic formalism. It becomes a variation on a theme that only now appears to have been the first
instance of new media. Such a move strikes me as remarkably common in
new media today (witness the spate of books about when old media were
new), even if Manovich’s performance of it is somehow more influential
and appealing to those with nostalgia for the age of the auteur. Galloway’s
critique of the seeming disappearance of history is appropriate then: the
work of thought in Manovich’s case—the reduction of new media to the
thing that cinema was always about to give birth to—cannot even take
place without a forgetting of the specificities of history.
To some extent, the fate of media studies hangs on the question of
whether this history matters. In some ways, as in nearly all mainstream
sciences today, the accurate and responsible recognition of history in media
studies remains irrelevant—or at least only rears its head when a priority dispute or a prize is at stake. This could be the becoming-scientific of
media studies, or it could be fodder for another generation’s critique and
reformulation. For my money, reducing new media to the formalisms of
cinema has a different and more troubling effect: it carves out for new
media studies a space focused strictly on the aesthetics of interaction, especially those studies that involve perceptibility, the body, and affect. What
does this carving leave out? Might it be possible to learn something from
open source software that would highlight the negative image of this
carve-out, the kinds of new media–enabled practices, problems, and art
forms that are really not participating in quite the same set of problems as
cinema or new media recompiled as cinema? What are the effects of this
appeal to cinema, in contrast to an appeal to actually existing new media?
Finally, perhaps not unrelated, it is (to me) surprising that that none of
these pieces reflect, even if only in passing, on whether open source means
anything for scholarly production in the humanities itself. This could
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unfold in several dimensions. In the simplest dimension, it is a question
of whether open access is compatible with humanities scholarship? Why
is there such resistance to it in the humanities? Of what advantage is it to
allow giant corporations to control nearly every stage of the production
of our work and to charge us unsustainable sums for the pleasure? How
might it be possible to use our scholarship to help transform the system of
hiring, promotion, and tenure into one that both values and validates the
availability of work in any medium and not its inaccessibility and restriction to the standard-form written article? I’m all for critical suspicion
around open access and its utopian promises, but there might be a baby/
bathwater problem needing our attention here.
But there are other dimensions to this, as well: if open source means
open interfaces today, what does that mean for humanities scholarship?
I know what it means for so-called digital humanities scholarship, where
the question of whether one can access Google maps or Google books in
some dynamic and unconstrained way remains a hot one—though the
question of whether one should seems a less lively part of the discussion.
But what does it mean for writing, for theory, or for the organization
and efficacy of thought today? Examples such as collaborative fan-fiction
writing or the new poets and their explorations of the Internet and its
possibilities should serve as key guides, if not harbingers, of what scholarship might become, if it is not to disappear entirely the way so much
once-valuable software has. Where are the open interfaces in the humanities today? Or are we stuck with incompatibilities and lock-ins? Should
we change more of our practices, or resist the song of openness ever more
strongly? Are we sure we know, any longer, what open source means?
Christopher M. Kelty is an associate professor in the Department of Information Studies, the Center
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Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software (Duke University Press, 2008).
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